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1  Backgrounds
Global demand for gasoline is affected by technological change, global population 
growth, motor vehicle ownership and heating oil consumption. Since the last decade, we 
can clearly observe that gasoline prices are highly volatile and this makes price model-
ling and forecasting, and risk management very challenging. Global warming and green-
house gas emissions interact with the demand for gasoline. However, political instability 
in the oil-producing countries caused a remarkable disruption in energy supply, market 
equilibrium and prices since the 1990s.
In the gasoline market the equilibrium price is set at the intersection point of mar-
ket aggregated demand and supply. Gasoline demand modelling, following Ramsey 
et al. (1975), Dahl (1979, 1995), and Yang and Hu (1984), considers supply and demand 
to emphasize supply along with demand in the gasoline market, and also the level of 
supply-side intervention and policy in the gasoline market. Relatedly, Dahl and Dugga 
(1996) studied price elasticity of demand and supply in US oil market and indicated 
that US oil reserves to be elastic. Furthermore, Hunter and Tabaghdehi (2013a) exam-
ined gasoline price behaviour across different regions in the long-run and the short-run, 
specifying that the market structures and price dynamics may differ across regions.
For a product such as gasoline, there is little quality uncertainty as the quality of the 
product is regulated for reasons of safety and the manufacturer needs to meet a standard 
for the product to avoid litigation from the public, corporate employees and the motor 
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vehicle manufacturers who might engage in a class action where such failure to impact 
their reputation and affect sales.
Price uncertainty is an important issue, and it might reflect the potential for disequi-
librium in the energy market (Arrow 1962). Hence in this analysis, using different regime 
switching models we investigate the market disequilibrium caused by imperfect compe-
tition or price leadership in gasoline market. Yang and Hu (1984) formulate an endog-
enous switching model to examine a gasoline market but their analysis paid no attention 
to non-stationarity. Hence, in this article we formulate two different switching models 
more adequately and examine their behaviour and the nature of the different regimes in 
the US gasoline market.
2  Methods
The study of demand and the notion of an economy or a market is not in full equilibrium 
which was investigated in early literature by Hicks (1936), Arrow (1962), Maddala and 
Nelson (1974), Rosen and Quandt (1978), Maddala (1983), Muellbauer (1983), Andrews 
and Nickell (1985) and Robinson (1994). Under disequilibrium hypothesis only one 
regime can be observed at the time.1 However, the disequilibrium approach derived ini-
tially to estimate demand and supply equation in a static context was not developed to 
handle non-stationary series. Here a static switching structure is devised to identify 
demand via the min condition and to measure the long-run market failure.
At disequilibrium, the market follows min condition shown in Eq. 1:
where
  • Qt = St if Dt > St this implies there is excess demand and quantity transacted in the 
market is equal to quantity supplied
  • Qt = Dt if Dt < St this implies there is excess supply in the market and quantity trans-
acted in the market is equal to quantity demanded.
Yang and Hu (1984) formulated a gasoline market model testing disequilibrium that 
may have been caused by either imperfect price adjustment by buyers and sellers or 
institutional price restrictions. In Yang and Hu (1984) they take no account of non-sta-
tionarity or the potential that the estimations may need to handle an autoregressive unit 
root. In their estimation using the errors is serially correlated and the test statistics are 
non-standard.
To address this, we applied the Phillips–Hansen fully modified regression to estimate 
the parameter of the long-run relation. Phillips and Hansen (1990) developed a semi-
parametric method of estimation to take account of moving average or autoregressive 
errors. The Phillips–Hansen method estimates the parameters of a single cointegration 
relation by fully modified regression. Consider the OLS regression below:
1 Muellbauer (1983) suggested at the aggregate level the switch would be smoothed that gave rise to continuous switch-
ing.
(1)Qt = min(Dt , St)
(2)yt = α0 + α1xt + εt
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where yt is an I(1) variable, xt is a k × 1 vector of I(1) regressors, and the first-difference 
of xt is stationary: Δxt = μ + υt.
The distribution of the OLS estimator in Eq.  (2) with non-stationary series is non-
standard, and the parameters are super-consistent when there is cointegration, although 
the t tests are not well defined. Hence, the Phillips and Hansen fully modified OLS esti-
mator computes an estimate of the long-run variance that corrects the regression to take 
account of the serial correlation associated with the potential unit root in the error. With 
the exception of the conventional least squares regression result that applies with truly 
exogenous variables such as indicators, dummies and time, the estimations and infer-
ence are valid as long as the dependent variable and any potentially endogenous regres-
sors are I(1), Kitamura and Phillips (1995).
Here we analysed disequilibrium switching model using the monthly data of regular 
gasoline sales level (Q), regular retail gasoline real price (RP), WTI crude oil price (PW), 
consumer price index (CPI), producer price index (PPI), gasoline unleaded regular cost 
of insurance and freight (Cost), total energy consumption (EXP), city-gate gas real price 
(PGAS), disposable income (Y), automobile sales (Auto), price of the residual fuel oil 
(PRes), price of the distillate fuel oil (Pdst), and refineries net input of crude oil (RI) from 
1992:1 to 2012:9 in the USA.2 The data in log levels and their differences are graphed in 
Figs. 1 and 3, and the frequency distributions of both datasets are plotted in Figs. 2 and 
4. 
From Figs. 1 and 3, the price level has drift, whereas the differenced series appear to 
move randomly around the fixed mean. Furthermore, Fig. 1 suggests LEXPN, LRI, LCPI, 
LAUT, and LQ are seasonal. Considering Figs. 2 and 4, the frequency distributions of 
all the log data (Fig. 2) suggests the series do not revert to mean and overall might sug-
gest two regimes, while the frequency distribution of data in their log differences (Fig. 4) 
seems to be closer to normality.
Hence using same variables as Yang and Hu (1984) and furthermore using Phillips–
Hansen modified method, we identified following switching disequilibrium equation:
In Eq. 3 Dt is aggregated gasoline demand, Pt is the regular retail gasoline real price, Yt is 
disposal income, and  Autt is automobile sales, and ωdt include explanatory variables not 
clarified in the demand function. Similarly in the supply-side equation, the Pw is the 
WTI crude oil price,3 Pres is price of residual fuel oil, and Pdst is price of distillate fuel oil 
to analyse the substitution effect in the production process,4 RI is refineries net input of 
crude oil, dd is dummy demand, and ds is dummy supply, and ωst comprise unexplained 
explanatory variables.
2 The data set have been obtained from energy information administration website (www.eia.gov), and Bureau of Labour 
Statistics website (www.bls.gov).
(3)
Qt = γ 0 + γ 1Dt + γ 2d
d





Autt + ωdt + γ 5d
s





Pdst t + γ 8d
s
Pw t + γ 9d
s
RI t + ωst
3 Hotelling (1932) determined that profit-maximising price-taking firms based their prices on selection of their input 
and output levels. Thus the crude oil price plays an important role in the supply function for the gasoline market.
4 No. 2 distillate fuel oil is used in high-speed diesel engines, such as those in railroad locomotives, trucks, and automo-
biles.
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To identify the dummy for demand (dd) and supply (ds), we evaluated relative price 
from the following equations, where if ΔlpRetail Price − ΔlpConsumer Price Index > 0 indicates 
that the relative price is increasing and D > S which classifies ds, otherwise (ΔlpRetail 
Price − ΔlpConsumer Price Index < 0) there is a decrease in the relative price identifying that 
D < S and that indicates dd.
3  Results and discussions
All the above are in logarithms and regime dependent. The results for the above disequi-
librium switching estimations are presented as demand and supply equations in Table 1. 
In the demand-side equation all estimated parameters are statistically significant with 
their expected sign. A 1% increase in the retail gasoline price will reduce the demand for 
gasoline by 3.43%, and this implies that consumers are sensitive to gasoline price changes 
in changing their gasoline consumption level. A significant positive income coefficient 
indicates that an increase in consumer income and automobile sales level may increase 
gasoline demand in the market. This result indicates that a 1% increase in the consumer 
income will increase the gasoline demand by 2.87% and it shows consumers are respon-
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Fig. 1 Plot of LExpn, LRP, LRPGas, LPRes, LPdst, LPW, LY, LRI, LPPI, LCPI, LCost, LAUT and LQ in the US
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The positive sign of γ5 indicates that the price of gasoline affects a gasoline supply pos-
itively that is consistent with economic theory. Its significance value of 3.07 identifies 
that refiners are sensitive to gasoline price changes in changing output level. However, 
the negative sign of γ6 and γ7 indicates that residual fuel oil and distillate fuel oil price 
rises will reduce the supply of gasoline so the refiner produces for these markets where 
possible and substitute away from gasoline. While insignificant coefficients γ6 and γ7 
identify that changes in gasoline production cannot be attributed to fluctuations in price 










































































































































































































Fig. 2 Frequency distributions of LExpn, LRP, LRPGas, LPRes, LPdst, LPW, LY, LRI, LPPI, LCPI, LCost, LAUT and LQ 
in the US
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input price on gasoline supply, has an expected negative sign but statistically insignifi-
cant identifying that change in gasoline production cannot be impacted by input price 
fluctuations. Finally, the refineries net input of crude oil explains the scale effect in the 
supply equation, has a negative sign and is statistically insignificant indicating that it 
appears not to affect gasoline supply.
As we see in Table 1, the supply equation mostly contains insignificant coefficients and 
to further investigate this relation we estimate the new model below. However, from eco-
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Fig. 3 Plot of DLEXP, DLRP, DLRPGAS, DLPRES, DLPDST, DLPW, DLY, DLRI, DLPPI, DLCPI, DLCOST, DLAUT and 
DLQ in the USA
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as consumer price index, total energy expenditure, and the city-gate real gas price as a 
substitute good that affects consumer’s gasoline consumption behaviour. Similarly the 
firm supply may be affected by other factors such as the cost and producer price index. 
Following disequilibrium switching equation estimated using Phillips and Hansen modi-
fied method:
(4)


























































































































































































Fig. 4 Frequency distributions of DLEXP, DLRP, DLRPGAS, DLPRES, DLPDST, DLPW, DLY, DLRI, DLPPI, DLCPI, 
DLCOST, DLAUT and DLQ in the USA
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where Pt is the price of the gasoline, CPI is consumer price index, EXP is total energy 
expenditure, PGas is city-gate gas real price, Yt is disposal income, and νdi includes 
explanatory variables not clarified in the demand function. Also in the supply-side equa-
tion PW is the WTI crude oil price,5 PPI is the producer price index, and Ct is unleaded 
regular gasoline costs (insurance and freight), and νst comprise unexplained explanatory 
variables in the supply equation.
The results for the estimation of Eq.  (4) are presented in Table  2. For the demand-
side equation all estimated parameters are significant with expected sign except φ3 that 
could be due to the high usage of the other energy sources in comparison with gasoline. 
The φ2 indicates that a 1% increase in the retail gasoline price will reduce the demand 
for gasoline by 11.19%; this implies that consumers are highly sensitive to gasoline price 
in changing their gasoline consumption level. The income coefficient (φ6) suggests that 
a 1% increase in consumer income will increase the gasoline demand by 6.26% and it 
shows consumers are responsive to income in changing their gasoline demand level. 
In the supply side of the equation only φ10 has the expected sign that is also statisti-
cally insignificant. This implies that gasoline supply is not be strongly affected by other 
factors.
Comparing above estimations 3 and 4 via the regression that imposes the switch, the 
variables used in Eq.  4 seem to explain the model more appropriately as most of the 
5 Hotelling (1932) identified that profit-maximising price-taking firms based to their prices they determine their input 
and output level. Thus crude oil price plays an important role in the supply function of the gasoline market.
Table 1 Static disequilibrium switching estimation 1
Qt = γ0 + γ1 Dt + γ2dd Pt + γ3dd Yt + γ4dd Autt + ωdt + γ5dsPt + γ6ds Pres t + γ7ds Pdst t + γ8 ds Pw t + γ9 dsRIt + ωst. All variables 
are in log scales and all prices are real price data. Values without the brackets present fully modified Phillips–Hansen 
t-statistic, values in () show standard errors, and values in [] display p values
**Significant at the 1% and*Significant at the 5%
Variable Parameter Bartlett weighs,  
truncation  
lag = 64
Demand-side equation γ0 14.16** [0.00]
(0.89)
Dt γ1 − 3.78** [0.00]
(0.94)
Pt γ2 − 3.43** [0.00]
(0.03)
Yt γ3 2.87** [0.00]
(0.04)
Autt γ4 10.21** [0.00]
(0.03)
Supply-side equation Pt γ5 3.07** [0.00]
(0.05)
Pres t γ6 − 1.005 [0.92]
(0.03)
Pdst t γ7 − 3.26 [0.74]
(0.05)
Pw t γ8 − 0.02 [0.98]
(0.05)
RIt γ9 − 0.34 [0.73]
(0.07)
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variables are statistically significant. The significant coefficient subject to all series being 
I(1) implies that this is a long-run relation. This suggests that models based on the sup-
ply and demand regimes give rise to meaningful long-run equations.
Here, the intention is to use Markov switching method as a mechanism to identify 
supply and demand regimes in the long-run. Each regime is characterized by a different 
parameterization. We focus on modelling the gasoline market as a single market and to 
observe both sides of the market. The primary method to estimate disequilibrium mod-
els was investigated in a static context by Fair and Jaffee (1972), Fair and Kelejian (1974) 
and Maddala and Nelson (1974). Maddala (1983) provides a useful summary of this early 
literature and compares this with the same latent effects captured by error correction 
models.
Considering an static model would usually be poorly specified especially in relation 
to serial correlation. In Robinson (1994) a number of corrections were applied to take 
account of this and in Davidson et  al. (1978) the notion of disequilibrium in dynamic 
equations was embedded in error correction models. Furthermore, Muellbauer (1983) 
developed at the macro-level continuous switching when markets are aggregated. 
Maddala (1983) discussed disequilibrium where the latent variable equilibrium term is 
determined by switching, and this is embedded in an error correction term.
The regime switching ECM can be explained as an expanded linear error correction 
model by allowing the short-run parameters to switch in different regimes. Hence a 
Table 2 Static disequilibrium switching estimation 2
Qt = φ0 + φ1 Dt + φ2dd Pt + φ3dd CPIt + φ4dd EXPt + φ5dd PGas + φ6 ddYt + νdt +φ7 ds Pt +φ8ds Ct + φ9ds PPI + φ10 ds PW 
t + νst. All variables are in log scales and all prices are real price data. Values without the brackets presents fully modified 
Phillips–Hansen t-statistic, values in () shows standard errors, and values in [] displays p values
**Significant at the 1% and *Significant at the 5%
Variable Parameter Bartlett weighs,  
truncation  
lag = 64
Demand-side equation φ0 24.17** [0.00]
(0.62)
Dt φ1 − 8.91** [0.00]
(1.19)
Pt φ2 − 11.19** [0.00]
(0.06)
CPIt φ3 9.71** [0.00]
(0.09)
EXPt φ4 7.15** [0.00]
(0.13)
PGas φ5 − 3.21** [0.00]
(0.06)
Yt φ6 6.26** [0.00]
(0.00)
Supply-side equation Pt φ7 − 0.82 [0.41]
(0.09)
Ct φ8 4.31** [0.00]
(0.09)
PPI φ9 -5.31** [0.00]
(0.15)
PW t φ10 − 1.18 [0.24]
(0.08)
Page 10 of 14Tabaghdehi  Economic Structures  (2018) 7:9 
Markov switching error correction model (MSECM) can be used to describe the short-
run variation in gasoline sales. MSECM signifies that when the system is in a stable state 
the error correction takes place and in the unstable state there are deviations from the 
long-run equilibrium that cannot be corrected through the ECM. In terms of the dis-
equilibrium model, these would be the same when there is correction to another equilib-
rium state.
Here the error correction model is also embedded in a Markov switching equation and 
the Markov regime switching error-correction model (MRSECM) is used to determine 
regimes that are latent in the data.
Let us assume that the linear regression model is:
where yt denotes the dependent variable, Xti denotes the matrix of independent vari-
ables. The above regression model is separated into two relations for:
where Zi determines the ith observation that is generated for each regime, based on the 
unknown coefficient vector γ′ that defines the switch and u1i and u2i are assumed nor-
mally distributed with mean zero and variance–covariance matrix:
where σ1 shows the variance of the first regime and σ2 indicates the variance of the sec-
ond regime. If σ1 ≠ σ2 and β1 ≠ β2, then the regression relation switches between two 
regimes.6 The Markov regime switching error correction model that might be a single 
equation from the VECM with two regimes is defined on the first-differenced monthly 
relative gasoline price:
yt = βXti + ut .
(5)Regime (1): yi=β ′1X1i + u1i if γ
′Zi ≥ ui












6 By knowing which observation of the dependent variable of y was generated by which regime a Chow test can examine 
whether σ1 = σ2 and β1′ = β2′. However if this is unknown and it is not clear which of the dependent variable (y) was gen-
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where7 γr,i , ζr,i , ηr,i , θr,i , r,i , κr,i , and νr,i are the short-run dynamics of price data which 
is allowed to change within the regimes, s identifies the regime at time t, and εt is the 
vector of error terms. Using the Markov regime-switching model, we describe the equi-
librium correction via a non-linear algorithm that computes and maximizes the empiri-
cal likelihood in a two-regime model. With a Markov process at each period (t), the 
probability of the switch from regime i to j can be calculated using the equation below:
where the probability of remaining in a given regime i is signified as pii, consequently 
pij = 1 − pii signifies the probability of switching from regime i to the other regime, j. 
Similarly pjj is the probability of remaining in the regime j and pji = 1 − pjj is probability 
of switching to regime i.
Correspondingly Table 3 shows that parameters used in switching Eq. 7 are affected 
by the regimes and we identified that regimes are persistent and the probability of stay-
ing in regime 0 is 0.502 and the probability of staying in regime 1 is 0.465. By comparing 
the demand and supply dummies (dd and ds used in Eqs. 3 and 4) with the regimes, we 
identified that regime 0 is demand and regime 1 is supply regime. This implies that regu-
lar gasoline costs (insurance and freight), gas retail real price, residual fuel oil price, and 
distillate fuel oil price significantly affect the relative real gasoline price. It is of interest 
to note that this would seem to lend support to the notion of switching and that equi-
librium may not just be captured by the disequilibrium term related to error correction 
behaviour.
Assuming stationarity of price proportion based on conventional inference, the two 
correction terms in Table 3 are significant and this implies negative reaction of gasoline 
market prices to CPI as indicative of demand responds, and positive reaction of gasoline 
market price to PPI as indicative of supply responds.
4  Conclusions
In this paper, we applied regime switching model on market data to identify any poten-
tial disequilibrium in the long-run. Long-run disequilibrium in energy markets indicates 
the need to consider the demand and supply management to improve energy market 
efficiency and stability. The results on the disequilibrium study imply that the long-run 
gasoline price dynamics may not always correct the system. Furthermore, the Markov 
regime switching model with two different regimes identifies there is a significant effect 
of regular gasoline costs, gas retail real price, residual fuel oil price, and distillate fuel oil 
price on retail gasoline prices in the USA and consequently on the stability of correction 
to these regimes.
Here it has been shown that the switch model can be estimated by a single regres-
sion with the series being scaled by dummy variables of DS and DD. The dummy DS is 
1 when the change in the relative price exceeds zero, while DD is 1 when the change in 
the relative price is less than zero. With sufficient data it should be possible to utilize the 
two-step regression method of Engle and Granger (1987) to test whether the regression 
residuals are stationary. Unfortunately, the switch increases the number of parameters as 
7 Pg is gasoline retail price, PGAS is gas retail real price to analyse the substitute effect in the demand process, CPI is 
consumer price index, PPI is producer price index, COST is unleaded regular gasoline costs (insurance and freight), 
PWTI is WTI spot price, Pres is residual fuel oil price and Pdst is distillate fuel oil price.
pij = Pr
(
st+1 = j|st = i
)
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the demand and supply equations are being computed simultaneously so with more than 
two hundred observations the available software cannot compute the critical value of 
Dickey Fuller test. To determine the importance of the parameters in the cointegrating 
regression, they are computed using the fully modified estimation procedure of Phillips 
and Hansen (1990). The semi-parametric method corrects the estimator for both autore-
gressive and moving average errors, and this implies that it is possible to determine the 
significance of these parameters via conventional inference as long as the regressors are 
I(1) except for series that are truly exogenous.
The data are then separated using the relative as compared with absolute price 
changes. This separation is applied to the static model of Yang and Hu (1984) on a more 
recent data set. However, the static model only has a long-run interpretation. Based on 
the estimation results, the demand curve seems well defined, while it is less easy to inter-
pret the second relation as a supply equation. A more recent approach to demand has 
also been used to define this equation and compared with a new supply equation, but 
this worked less well than the model of Yang and Hu (1984). Another interpretation of 
the supply equations is that the long-run supply function is flat implying firms set price 
as a mark-up of their cost.
Table 3 Dynamic disequilibrium switching
Variables 
in Eq. 7
Coefficient t-statistics Variables 
in Eq. 7
Coefficient t-statistics Variables 
in Eq. 7
Coefficient t-statistics
DPCPI_2 − 0.668** − 16.7 DLCOST_1 0.097** 5.46 DLRPGAS_1 0.020 6.16
DPCPI_3 − 0.425** − 8.86 DLCOST_2 0.157** 7.20 DLRPGAS_2 0.043** 2.78
DPCPI_5 − 0.359** − 7.79 DLCOST_3 0.241** 10.3 DLRPGAS_3 0.064** 8.55
DPCPI_6 − 0.295** − 5.91 DLCOST_4 0.063** 3.19 DLRPGAS_6 − 0.100** − 7.22
DPCPI_7 − 0.338** − 6.67 DLCOST_6 0.164** 7.61 DLRPGAS_8 0.091** 6.68
DPCPI_8 0.150** 2.76 DLCOST_7 0.225** 8.94 DLRPGAS_9 − 0.070** − 3.54
DPCPI_9 − 0.570** − 11.0 DLCOST_8 0.135** 5.55 DLRP-
GAS_10
− 0.049** 2.68
DPCPI_10 0.226** 4.48 DLCOST_9 0.155** 6.60 DLRP-
GAS_11
− 0.072** 4.02
DPCPI_12 − 0.184** − 4.38 DLCOST_10 0.065** 2.96 DLPDST_2 0.070* − 5.95
DPCPI_14 0.092** 3.65 DLCOST_11 0.162** 8.54 DLPDST_4 0.240** − 3.64
DPCPI_15 − 0.171** − 6.64 DLPW_1 0.137** 6.16 DLPDST_5 − 0.411** − 2.43
DPCPI_16 0.338** 14.2 DLPW_2 0.074** 2.78 DLPDST_7 − 0.188** 1.51
LPCPI_1 − 0.011** − 2.00 DLPW_3 0.203** 8.55 DLPDST_8 − 0.421** 3.26
LCPIPPI_1 0.058** 1.95 DLPW_4 − 0.199** − 7.22 DLPDST_9 0.198** 4.83
DCPIPPI_1 − 0.333** − 4.82 DLPW_5 0.181** 6.68 DLPDST_11 0.086** − 7.13
DCPIPPI_3 0.186** 2.34 DLPW_6 − 0.088** − 3.54 DLPDST_13 − 0.050 6.37
DCPIPPI_5 − 0.869** − 10.8 DLPW_7 0.075** 2.68 DLPRES_1 0.070** − 4.93
DCPIPPI_6 − 0.956** − 12.1 DLPW_8 0.105** 4.02 DLPRES_3 − 0.071** − 3.35
DCPIPPI_7 − 0.491** − 5.99 DLPW_11 − 0.157** − 5.95 DLPRES_5 0.069** − 5.50
DCPIPPI_8 0.314** 3.95 DLPW_12 − 0.080** − 3.64 DLPRES_6 0.074** 1.80
DCPIPPI_9 − 0.228** − 2.64 DLPW_13 − 0.060** − 2.43 DLPRES_7 − 0.113** 6.37
DCPIPPI_10 0.520** 6.54 Constant(0) 0.417** − 9.94
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The final analysis relates to a dynamic model for real gasoline prices in the USA from 
1993 to 2012. This approach is based on an error correction model where the adjust-
ment coefficients switch between regimes. Disequilibrium is captured by the correction, 
but this may be unstable or relate to a further equilibrium. Estimation of the Markov 
Switching ECM indicates that deviations from long-run equilibrium have an effect on 
gasoline price dynamics. Also the result signifies that regular gasoline costs (insurance 
and freight), gas retail real price, residual fuel oil price, and distillate fuel oil price sig-
nificantly affect the relative real gasoline price in the market. More specifically it dem-
onstrates that there are two different regimes of Supply and Demand in the US gasoline 
market indicating that the market collusion may be less concern of this market in the 
USA.
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